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Developments in the global law enforcement of cyber-crime 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The rapid expansion of computer connectivity has provided opportunities for 
criminals to exploit security vulnerabilities in the on-line environment. Most 
detrimental are malicious and exploit codes that interrupt computer operations on a 
global scale and along with other cyber-crimes threaten e-commerce.   Cyber-crime is 
often traditional crime (e.g. fraud, identify theft, child pornography) albeit executed 
swiftly and to vast numbers of potential victims, as well as unauthorised access, 
damage and interference to computer systems. The cross-national nature of most 
computer related crimes have rendered many time-honoured methods of policing both 
domestically and in cross-border situations ineffective even in advanced nations, 
while the ‘digital divide’ provides ‘safe havens’ for cyber-criminals. In response to 
the threat of cyber-crime there is an urgent need to reform methods of mutual legal 
assistance and to develop trans-national policing capability. The international 
response is briefly outlined in the context of the United Nations Transnational 
Organised Crime Convention (in force from September 2003) and the Council of 
Europe’s innovative Cybercrime Convention (in force from July 2004). In addition 
the role of the United Nations, Interpol, other institutions and bi-lateral, regional and 
other efforts aimed a creating a seamless web of enforcement against cyber-criminals 
are described. The potential for potent global enforcement mechanisms are discussed. 
 
Key words: computer related crime; cyber-crime; transnational crime; Council of 
Europe Cybercrime Convention, crime prevention; and mutual legal assistance 
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Introduction 
 
 
The rapid development of computer connectivity and the role of the Internet in the 
emergence of new e-commerce have compelled national governments and 
international agencies to address the need for regulation and safety on the 
‘information superhighways’. These astonishing tools have eroded the traditional 
barriers to communication, compressed our concepts of time and place, and changed 
the way a large part of the world does business. The convergence of computing and 
communications and the exponential growth of digital technology have brought 
enormous benefits but with these new benefits come greater risks both domestically 
and across borders. The new opportunities created in ‘cyberspace’ have enhanced the 
capacity of individual offenders and criminal networks that have emerged to exploit 
vulnerabilities in the ‘new’ economy.  
 
The role of digital and information technologies in the generation of national wealth 
now means that the new risks associated with these changes require continued 
attention on all fronts: national, regional and international. While the process of 
‘globalisation’ continues to accelerate, a fully global response to the problems of 
security in the digital age has yet to emerge and efforts to secure cyberspace has been 
reactive rather than proactive. Developments in the trans-national policing of 
‘cyberspace’ so essential in addressing cyber-crime are the focus of this paper and it 
outlines what the international community has achieved so far. 
 
Controlling crime involving digital technology and computer networks will also 
require a variety of new networks: networks between police and other agencies within 
government, networks between police and private institutions, and networks of police 
across national borders. Over the past decade, considerable progress has been made 
within and between nations to develop the capacity of police to respond to cyber-
crime and there is now growing awareness amongst computer users of the need for 
basic security on-line. Yet the pace of technological change will continue unabated, 
and the adaptability of cyber-criminals will continue to pose challenges for law 
enforcement. Thus the cliché ‘think globally act locally’ is especially pertinent in the 
control of cybercrime. The remarkable quickening of transnational law enforcement 
cooperation in response to cybercrime and other global threats has radically altered 
expectations about what may be achieved at the international level. As promising as 
this development may be what has been achieved can only be regarded as a 
beginning. 
 
Until very recently it was not possible to talk about an international consensus on 
combating cyber-crime, especially the transnational forms it often takes. However, 
there is now a positive ‘moral climate’ for enforcement action, whether by civil, 
criminal or administrative measures, and this cross-border cooperation recognises 
what sociologists call ‘communities of shared fate’. At the international level two new 
treaty instruments provide a sound basis for the essential cross-border law 
enforcement cooperation required to combat cyber crime.  The first of these 
instruments, the Council of Europe’s Cyber-crime Convention, is purpose built and 
although designed as a regional mechanism has global significance. The second is the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which is global 
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in scope but indirectly deals with cyber-crime when carried out by criminal networks 
in relation to serious crime.  
 
The push for a universal instrument has also gained momentum and a UN draft 
resolution in 2003 at the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly on 
‘Cybersecurity and the protection of critical information infrastructures’, (co-
sponsored by Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Ethiopia and the United States of 
America), invited Member States and all relevant international organizations to take 
into account the need to protect critical information structures from possible misuse, 
including tracing attacks and, where appropriate, the disclosure of information to 
other nations (Redo 2004). Yet the rapid development of a purpose-built UN cyber-
crime treaty is unlikely because many of the digitally advanced states prefer to extend 
the reach of the Council of Europe’s convention to more countries, await assessment 
of the effectiveness of the convention, and are struggling to provide expertise to meet 
the demand for comprehensive counter measures including the essential mutual legal 
assistance (see Korean Institute of Criminology 2005, Workshop 6 ‘Measures to 
Combat Computer-related Crime’ 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention).   Thus the 
role of agencies such as the United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention (UNDCP) and its Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP), 
Interpol, the Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (OECD), the G8 
group of nations and regional bodies such as the European Union (EU), Organisation 
of American States (OAS), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and 
the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) provide the political and technical 
expertise necessary to effect cross-border cooperation in policing.  The web of 
relationships that such supra-state agencies play in responding to cybercrime is also 
briefly described. 
 
 
Challenges 
 
Law enforcement agencies in many jurisdictions have been unable to respond 
effectively to cybercrime and even in the most advanced nations, ‘play catch-up’ with 
cyber savvy criminals (Sussmann, 1999, Council for Security Cooperation Asia and 
Pacific, 2004). Web-page ‘jacking’, considered fanciful only a few years ago, is an 
effective way to steal a customer’s identification. In December 2003 a cloned Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporations’ Internet banking web-page that 
compromised an unknown number of customers’ identification illustrates this form of 
cyber-theft (China Daily, December 7, 2003:2). At the extreme of the risks now 
posed, cyber-criminals operating in the context of failed or failing states contribute to 
the criminalisation of the world economy, by providing both safe havens and 
plundered resources (see Gros 2003). As never before and at little cost a single 
offender can inflict catastrophic loss or damage on individuals, companies, and 
governments from the other side of the world. For example a 14-year-old Hong Kong 
boy was arrested for creating a false website, purportedly authorised by a well-
regarded local newspaper. He posted on that website false information concerning the 
SARS epidemic, stating that Hong Kong would be declared a closed port. This caused 
widespread panic in the Hong Kong community. One consequence was supermarkets 
were over-run by fearful citizens stocking up on foodstuffs to tide them over the 
quarantine of Hong Kong. Calm was only restored some hours later when the 
government issued repeated public announcements denying the rumour. The 14-year-
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old was convicted and placed under welfare care for 12 months (HKSAR v Sum Cheuk 
Wa, FLS 700017/2003). With these risks has come the awareness that ‘information 
security’ is no longer a matter for the technical and computer specialist, but for 
millions of people who now engage these new media every day for business, 
communications and leisure.  
 
Forensic specialists tasked with investigating computer-related crime also face new 
challenges. A shift away from ‘script kiddie’ releases of malicious software to 
bespoke code designed to steal information, especially personal identification (ID) 
data. The greater use of encryption and access protection also poses a growing 
challenge of extracting evidence from computers, and servers. Another continuing 
problem was the reluctance of victims to report offences and that many victims are 
unaware that they or the computers had been compromised.  The implications of such 
activity for infrastructure protection are ominous (Semple 2004). The online 
availability of source code and automated ‘easy to use’ hacking tools that act as 
system reconnaissance provide multiple exploit tools and deploy ‘spy-ware’ (i.e. 
keystroke monitoring or transmission); this had also increased the risks of computer 
intrusion activity as a predicate to other criminal activity such as extortion, financial 
or Internet fraud, identity theft, telecommunications theft, and economic espionage. 
Moreover, ‘patch’ countermeasures have proved inadequate because too many users 
failed to update (regardless of whether the software was licit or illicit) as ‘MS blaster’ 
demonstrated, despite the availability of an effective patch some months before the 
release of this particular malicious code. 
 
Digital Divide 
The ‘digital divide’ between nation-states is growing rapidly and the role of 
‘advanced’ IT-based economies in bridging this divide is essential. Most developing 
countries do not have a telecommunications sector capable of supporting ICT.  In 
2000, the United Nations reported that only about 4.5% of the global population had 
network access, but that 44% of North Americans and 10% of Europeans did, while 
rates for Africa, Asia, and South America ranged from 0.3 to 1.6%. Currently, more 
than 98% of global Internet protocol bandwidth, at the regional level, connects to and 
from North America. Fifty-five countries account for 99% of worldwide spending on 
information technology production. A fifth of the world’s people living in the highest-
income countries have 86% of the world’s GDP and 93% of Internet users, whereas 
the bottom fifth have 1% of GDP and only 0.2% of Internet users (UN 2003, cited in 
Redo 2004; see also Norris 2001).   
 
Nowhere is this ‘digital divide’ more extreme than in Asia, with countries such as 
South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore leading the way with Internet access 
reaching as many as 70% of households (often with broadband), while Laos, 
Cambodia, Mongolia and Myanmar had less than 1% of their populations connected. 
However, rapid growth of computer use in China has seen their number of Internet 
users reach 94 million at the end of 2004, exceeding Japan, Taiwan and Korea 
combined. Although the proportion of households connected remains relatively low at 
about 7.2% the total number of users will exceed the number in North America by 
2008 (China Internet Network Information Center, ‘15th Statistical Survey Report on 
the Internet Development in China’, January 2005 see www.cnnic.net.cn visited 
January 25 2005). Like other regional forums, ASEAN has recognised the need for 
better policing cooperation and APEC has supported the important role of e-
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commerce in fostering economic development and through its ‘E Security Task 
Group’ (APEC Telecommunications and Information Working Group) has begun to 
provide guidance on a raft of issues relating to ‘e-readiness’ and governance. 
 
Terrorism and organised crime 
There is also growing concern about the potential for misuse of ICT by terrorists. This 
has made cyber-terrorism a major strategic issue in the prevention of terrorism 
because the technologies themselves may be attacked, and can also be used to support 
of terrorism in the same way ICTs are used by predatory cyber criminals. The use of 
computers by terrorists to plan, organise and communicate is well documented and 
counter-terrorism agencies have commonly identified high-tech media such as cellular 
and satellite telephones and Internet-based communications. Cases have also been 
reported in which hacking, physical thefts or the corruption of officials has been used 
to gain access to sensitive law enforcement information (see International Narcotics 
Control Board [INCB] 2001). The global reach of terrorism prompted the UN General 
Assembly in its resolution 51/210, to note the risk of terrorists using electronic or wire 
communication systems to carry out criminal acts (Redo 2000, 2004). The intersect 
between terrorism and organised crime in the post 9/11 environment have also 
necessitated more intrusive methods of monitoring ICT, notably the Internet and also 
pose significant threats to individual privacy.   
 
The increased utilisation of data surveillance technologies focused on identity and 
location are based on imperfect convergence technologies that aim to merge existing 
and new data sources to address the problems arising from ‘asymmetric warfare’ but 
compel greater collaboration between the private sector and policing agencies (Levi 
and Wall 2004). A direct outcome of this is the stress on critical infrastructure 
protection. This is particularly challenging, given that most elements of critical 
infrastructure such as power generation, telecommunications, transport, and 
institutions of the financial system are owned by the private sector. The need for 
cooperation between law enforcement and the private sector is obvious. To help 
bridge the public–private gap, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
introduced the ‘Infraguard Program’ with over 4000 members (Iden 2003) – a 
programme replicated in other countries.  Effective control of cyber-crime, however, 
requires more than cooperation between public and private security agencies. The role 
of the communications and IT industries in designing products that are resistant to 
crime and that facilitate detection and investigation is crucial.  
 
Collaborative enforcement  
The unsafe ‘highway’ analogy often used to describe the Internet aptly reminds us of 
the inherent decentralised and open architecture of the Internet (Lessig 2002). 
Although created originally for small and specialised communities operating in an 
environment of trust, the rapid global expansion of the Internet renders it highly 
vulnerable to a lawless frontier-style Internet culture. Technology is now driving 
cultural adaptations and providing an environment for criminal opportunities that can 
no longer be addressed by the technological ‘fix’. The traditional notion of 
information security with an emphasis on system and data protection no longer 
captures the scope of the risks and threats now unleashed by digital and wireless 
connectivity. The role of public and private law enforcement is crucial in curtailing 
criminal activity and ensuring the digital ‘highways’ are not lawless or hazardous but 
safe for all who wish to travel them. As digital technology becomes more pervasive 
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and interconnected, ordinary crime scenes will contain some form of digital evidence. 
Crucially many cyber crimes take place across jurisdictional boundaries with 
offenders routing attacks through various jurisdictions and can only be countered by a 
cross-border and international policing response. 
 
As a result, the need for reliable and efficient mechanisms for international 
cooperation in law enforcement matters has never been more urgent. ‘The fight 
against cyber-crime either is a global one or it makes no sense’ (Esposito, 2004:54). 
As noted, the international community has taken a number of significant steps to 
facilitate cross-border cooperation in criminal matters, including in the investigation 
and prosecution of cyber-crime. This paper considers some of the avenues for 
cooperation.  The focus is on the fast growing Asia Pacific region where the digital 
divide is extreme and the challenge of international cooperation consequently great. 
For certain, North Asia and China in particular will be super-weight players in any 
global system of cyber-crime prevention. However rapid the growth of information 
and communications technologies (ICT) may be, it is unlikely to continue its 
apparently exponential trajectory unless the digital divide is broken and poorer 
nations and neighbours are included. This is unlikely unless multinational 
corporations and governments in the richer states undertake positive long-term 
investment where it is most needed. 
 
 
Criminality and Computer Crime 
 
With government, industries, markets and consumers increasingly dependent on 
computer connectivity, they are prone to an array of threats. The most notable have 
been the widely publicised computer ‘viruses’, which have increased in both virulence 
and velocity since 2000. The beginning of 2004 saw the development of increasingly 
complex malicious code in the form of the "MyDoom" or "Norvag" worm. It 
apparently combined the effects of a worm, spreading rapidly across the Internet, with 
that of a distributed denial of service attack, where computing power is directed at a 
target system with a view towards shutting it down. In other words, infected 
computers were remotely ‘commandeered’ and directed against the target computer. 
The risks now posed by the release of malicious codes of increasing complexity (often 
specifically targeted against either a significant commercial or government site) were 
substantial and could threaten the viability of e-commerce (Moore et al. 2003, 
Staniford et al., 2002). Many observers note the danger of under-estimating the 
‘communities of cyber- criminals’ now operating in the various ‘chat rooms’ that 
proliferate on the Internet. Examples of these sorts of ‘crime rookeries’ can be found 
in the Internet web-based ‘businesses’ that often operate out of Eastern Europe and 
Russia to supply the latest counterfeit credit cards. At these e-commerce sites 
‘batches’ of cards may be purchased on line from ‘trustworthy’ but deviant 
businessmen. 
 
 
What is computer crime 
The scope of criminal activities and their social consequences can be summarised by a 
typology of computer-related crime that comprises the following: conventional crimes 
in which computers are instrumental to the offence, such as child pornography and 
intellectual property theft; attacks on computer networks; and conventional criminal 
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cases in which evidence exists in digital form.  The kinds of criminality encompass 
the following (by no means exhaustive) list: 
 
• Interference with lawful use of a computer: cyber-vandalism and terrorism; 
denial of service; insertion of viruses, worms and other malicious code. 
• Dissemination of offensive materials: pornography/child pornography; on-line 
gaming/betting; racist content; treasonous or sacrilegious content. 
• Threatening Communications: extortion; cyber-stalking. 
• Forgery/counterfeiting: ID theft; IP offences; software, CD, DVD piracy; 
copyright breaches etc. 
• Fraud: payment card fraud and e-funds transfer fraud; theft of Internet and 
telephone services; auction house and catalogue fraud; consumer fraud and 
direct sales (e.g. virtual ‘snake oils’); on-line securities fraud; and  
• Other: Illegal interception of communications; commercial/corporate 
espionage; communications in furtherance of criminal conspiracies; electronic 
money laundering. 
 
Many of these risks appear to mimic traditional criminal exploitation, albeit often 
executed with unprecedented ease, speed and impact across jurisdictions and thus the 
appropriate response is guided by new technological disciplines. The tasks of 
identifying cyber-criminals and bringing them to justice pose formidable challenges 
to law enforcement agencies across the globe, and require a degree and timeliness of 
cooperation that has been until only recently regarded as difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve. However, computer intrusion is now more likely a predicate to a more 
serious offence. Forensic computing and evidence preservation protocols are essential 
to effective investigation and prosecution, especially given the trans-border nature of 
evidence collection (Pollitt 2003; Chan 2001). In most cases it is unlikely that a 
computer expert will be available at the crime scene and the risks of contaminating 
the evidence are high. Consequently, as with other types of crime, the emphasis is on 
following the traditional chain-of-evidence rules and ensuring that command and 
control assigns the relevant expertise promptly to the task at hand. Frequently this will 
require drawing on expertise in the private sector or academia. 
 
Leading crime prevention scholars Newman and Clarke (2003) provide a review of 
crime prevention in the e-commerce context. In the online ‘situation’ the theft of 
information and the manipulation of identity and trust are the key. In their approach 
crime is an opportunity that occurs when the following conditions combine in time 
and place: the presence of motivated and tempted offenders (offender pathology is not 
required), and attractive and tempting targets in the absence of effective guardians. 
When this situation arises crime will occur providing the offenders also have 
appropriate resources (i.e. social and technical capital) to undertake the crime. 
Consequently efforts to reduce online offences and e-commerce crime need to 
recognise these basic ingredients and the numerous pathways or opportunities for 
crime in the online rather than face-to-face environment. A crucial factor is how trust 
is acquired and maintained when merchants must be more intrusive about their 
(unseen) customers’ identity and credit risk and the apparent ease in which trust is 
manipulated by fraudsters and others operating in the online situation. Of interest is 
Newman and Clarke’s attention to the risks posed in the post-transaction phase (i.e. 
the delivery of goods or services ordered), a matter often overlooked in discussions of 
cyber-crime. They note that most measures designed to counter crime in the e-
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commerce environment relied on either identifying potential offenders or shoring up 
‘guardianship’ via information security, but seldom addressed the relationship 
between these and nature of attractive targets. Risk-aversive systems of e-commerce 
therefore needed to be far more integrated than conventional environments and 
required attention to what information security engineers like to call ‘social 
engineering’. 
 
 Policing computer-related crime in the global village  
 
The relative novelty of computer crime has meant that most policing agencies have 
only recently developed specific measures for recording them. The advent of 
computer-related criminal laws and associated prosecutions and the establishment of 
computer emergency response teams (CERTs) and dedicated technology crime units 
within policing agencies, coupled with the development of crime victim awareness 
and consumer advocacy, have prompted jurisdictions at the forefront of the digital 
revolution to begin recording the incidence of illegality in cyberspace. However, in 
many jurisdictions cyber-crimes, if reported, may be not be differentiated from other 
commercial crime, fraud reports or criminal damage statistics or other categories. 
Thus the extent of computer-related crimes, even when reported, remains unclear. 
Police statistics about reported crime often tell us more about the activities and 
priorities of police than they do about the extent of crime. This is because in many 
traditional crimes, victims do not report them to the authorities. This is undoubtedly 
also the case for computer crime.  
 
The transnational nature of cyber-crime reflects the process of globalisation, which 
has intensified over the past two decades. The emergence of e-commerce, as well as 
the social dimension of the Internet and associated ‘cyber-crimes’, is a striking 
example of the challenges to the independent capability of nation-states to regulate 
social and economic order within their territories. Radical versions of globalisation go 
further and suggest that the nation-state system of international relations no longer 
provides an effective methodology for regulating either domestic or transnational 
activity, especially international trade. In either version of globalisation, ‘sub-state’ 
actors, such as large commercial institutions, play a crucial role in the emergence of 
what Sheptycki (2000) terms a transnational-state-system. In this system new 
configurations of actors and power emerge and transnational organisations (both licit 
and illicit) will flourish due to the diminishing sway of the state (Lizee 2000: 165). 
Given this context, what may eventuate in the absence of the rule of law in 
transnational environments is ‘governance without governments’ (Rosenau 1992). 
Shannon and Thomas (2005) also stress ‘human security’ perspectives in dealing with 
complex threats posed by cyber-crime and argue that over-reliance on the State, 
especially the public police, to address cyber-security issues would expose both 
markets and society to frequent low level but costly risks.  Consequently the role of 
public-private police partnerships in the market-place and the emergence of civil 
society on the Internet combined with public awareness has become essential to 
contain cyber-crime amongst ordinary users. 
 
While there now exist international conventions and treaties expressly designed to 
inhibit serious criminal networks or offenders operating across borders, the reach of 
these instruments is limited by the speed and scale of domestic ratification and 
consequential enabling laws. In dealing with IT crime, law enforcement is at a 
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disadvantage because of the remarkable speed in which cyber-crimes unfold against 
the typically ‘low-speed cooperation’ offered by traditional forms of mutual legal 
assistance.  The role of multinational agencies such as Interpol and the United Nations 
has never been more essential. Yet within Asia (and globally) the results fall far short 
of creating a seamless web of bilateral or multilateral agreements and enforcement 
that would ensure a hostile environment for cyber criminals. The compatibility of 
criminal activity with these global changes is illustrated by the expansion and 
convergence of the profitable business of smuggling of humans, pornography, 
narcotics or other illicit commodities with the development of communication 
infrastructure and trade.  
 
International Legal Cooperation 
The passage of the Council of Europe’s Cyber-crime Convention in December 2001 
and its activation in July 2004 provides for the first time an international legal 
mechanism for cooperation in law enforcement and harmonisation of laws (see 
Csonka 2005, Esposito 2004, Tanabe 2004 and Cross 2003). Forty-two states have 
signed the Convention (including non-Council member states: Canada, South Africa, 
Japan and the United States) but as of 2005 only 11 states had ratified the convention. 
Nevertheless, given the cumbersome nature of treaty ascension processes the 
ratification and activation (a minimum of five ratifications are necessary) of this 
Convention in less than three years has been extraordinarily rapid. The Convention’s 
‘First Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on the criminalisation of 
acts of a racist or xenophobic nature committed through computer systems’ that 
extends ‘content’ cybercrime to include ‘hate speech’ as well as child pornography 
has been signed by 25 states and awaits the ratification process (only 4 ratifications 
have occurred see http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/; visited September 22, 2005). 
Apart from widespread global efforts to suppress child pornography (De Schrijver, 
Van Renterghem and De Pauw 2004) little progress outside of Europe may be 
expected in relation to the kinds of hate crimes captured by the additional protocol 
(Broadhurst, 2004).  
 
The Convention, apart from enhancing mutual legal assistance (MLA), provides 
comprehensive powers to expedite preservation of stored computer data and partial 
disclosure of traffic data; to make production orders; to search computer systems; to 
seize stored computer data; to enable real-time collection of traffic data; and to 
intercept the content of questionable electronic data. A number of countries outside 
the Council of Europe, notably in South America are considering similar model 
legislation (see OAS recommendations on an inter-American cyber-crime instrument 
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyber.htm.) The convention is also open to any 
non-member state wishing to join (via a request to the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe). Indeed many jurisdictions in the Asian region, Thailand in 
particular, have looked at the Convention for guidance in formulating national laws. 
The hope was that the Council of Europe’s treaty would be widely ratified (Esposito 
2000:64). However, adoption of the Convention is not likely to be universal (Csonka 
2005: 326). Given the pressing need for a broader multilateral structure for cross-
border cooperation in the computer crime area, every effort should be made to open 
up the Convention for widespread accession as soon as is practicable (Bullwinkel 
2005). 
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These developments are mirrored by the increasing transnational activities of 
corporate and private security. Indeed, given the role of (self-) regulatory approaches 
by corporations, especially multinational enterprises, the role for transnational private 
policing is already significant and widespread (Johnston 2000). For example, private 
security is the major provider in the payment card industry, intellectual property 
investigations and airline security. The sheer volume of potential global cyber-crime 
activity compels police partnerships with banks, telecommunication providers and 
corporations. Partnerships also raise real issues of shared intelligence in environments 
of trust. Thus the mobilisation of so-called ‘private police’ and non-government 
organisations in partnership with public police are essential if cyber-crime is to be 
contained. Crime exploits the ‘gaps’ in the sovereign state system of international 
relations and unless it is recognised that in communities of ‘shared fate’, coordinated 
forms of regulatory endeavour (free, for example, from unduly strict or pedantic 
definitions of ‘dual criminality’) may be the only means to curtail cyber-crime and its 
inevitable cross-border dimension.  
 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
Since the early 1990s, beginning with the Eighth United Nations (UN) Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1990), the United Nations, 
with its network of institutes on crime prevention and criminal justice, has been 
actively involved in addressing problems of transnational crime and cyber-crime. The 
scope of computer-related crime affects every country in the UN and the UN General 
Assembly (GA) in 2001 promoted new international efforts to assist member states in 
dealing with computer-related crime. The Assembly in its ‘Plans of action for the 
implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the 
Challenges of the Twenty-first Century’ (GA resolution 56/261) devoted a special 
section to ‘Action against high-technology and computer-related crime’, in which it 
provided action-oriented policy recommendations for the prevention and control of 
these crimes. In 2002, the General Assembly addressed again the Vienna Plan of 
Action (GA resolution 57/170), and through the Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice recommended that the Eleventh United Congress on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice (Bangkok, 18–25 April 2005) consider the plan. In 
2001, the UN Secretary-General explored various options for further work on high-
technology and computer-related crime including: whether a global ‘treaty’, if any, 
should be normative or legally binding; what relationship, if any, this would have to 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime; how a treaty, once 
concluded, could be kept up to date; and how it may accommodate issues such as 
privacy, freedom of expression and other human rights and commercial interests 
(Redo 2004; Bowman 1996). The Eleventh Congress, as noted deferred action on the 
development of a UN cyber-crime treaty. 
 
Although not specifically directed at cyber-crime, the complementary role of the UN 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (in force as of 2003) is a highly 
relevant global instrument for addressing some of the more nefarious aspects of 
cyber-crime. The UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (the TOC 
Convention) was introduced in December 2000 in Palermo, Italy. The TOC 
Convention has been signed by 147 States (and 110 parties) and came into force on 
the 23 September 2003 (see www.undcp.org/crime_cicp_signatures_convention.html; 
visited September 22, 2005.)  The TOC Convention significantly extends the reach of 
the 1988 Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic 
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Substances. The TOC Convention enables mutual legal assistance (MLA) between 
states and establishes several offence categories: participation in an organised 
criminal group, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice as well as 
protocols in respect to trafficking in women and children (117 States and 64 parties 
with effect from December 25, 2003); illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms 
(52 States and 22 parties but not yet in force); and smuggling of migrants (112 States 
and 57 parties with effect 28 January 2004). Serious crime is defined broadly (conduct 
attracting punishment of four or more years’ imprisonment). The basis of the 
framework is one that yields such flexibility in the definitions of both organised and 
transnational crime that it may serve as a generic legislative model across diverse 
common law and continental systems. In addition, the TOC Convention expressly 
refers (Article 29 (2)) to methods for combating the misuse of computers and 
telecommunications networks, provisions for training and materials, especially 
assistance for developing countries, and places obligations on capable states. The 
TOC Convention also establishes a number of principles and arrangements for 
international cooperation, which may be taken as an example of a potent global 
instrument against cyber-crime, in line with Article 13.1 (a) of the United Nations 
Charter emphasising the progressive development of international law. They include 
regulations limiting the rule of double criminality for mutual assistance purposes and 
introduce ‘enterprise’ responsibility. 
 
The scope of the TOC Convention includes particular offences signatories are obliged 
to criminalise (Articles 5, 6, 8 and 23) as well as ‘serious crime’ (as defined in the 
Convention), ‘where the offence is transnational in nature and involves an organized 
criminal group’ (see Article 3(1)). Importantly, the definitions of ‘serious crime’ and 
‘organised criminal group’ reflect an understanding that organised criminal activity is 
no longer confined to a relatively narrow range of offences traditionally associated 
with organisations such as Triads and the Cosa Nostra. The TOC Convention, defines 
an offence as ‘transnational’ if it is: (a) committed in more than one State; (b) 
committed in a single State but planned, prepared, directed or controlled in another 
State; (c) committed in one State but involving an organised group whose activities 
cross national boundaries; or (d) committed in a single State but has ‘substantial 
effects’ in another State (see Article 3(2)). Many of the most common forms of cyber-
crime therefore qualify as ‘serious crime’ because such offences usually affect more 
than a single jurisdiction, often involve at least three or more actors, and are 
committed with the aim of achieving some financial or material benefit. 
 
Article 27 deals with police-to-police cooperation and reflects the types of assistance 
routinely provided among police officials in the absence of a formal agreement and 
reflects international consensus on the need for close coordination between law 
enforcement authorities. To achieve this goal, States are encouraged to promote the 
exchange of personnel and other experts, including liaison officers. Additionally, 
signatories are required to ‘make full use of agreements or arrangements, including 
international or regional organisations, to enhance the cooperation between their law 
enforcement agencies’ (Article 27(2)). With respect to formal MLA, Article 18 
contains provisions nearly as lengthy and detailed as a comprehensive bilateral MLA 
treaty. States may seek assistance in connection with: taking evidence or statements 
from persons; executing searches and seizures; obtaining business and/or government 
records; and identifying and tracing the proceeds of crime. A requested State has the 
discretion to decline assistance on the ground of the absence of dual criminality – a 
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potentially significant limitation in the cyber-crime context, as many countries do not 
have fully developed legislation in this area. The TOC Convention also provides for 
extradition (Article 16) even where a State Party makes extradition conditional on the 
existence of a bilateral treaty, Article 16 represents a major step forward because its 
effect is to incorporate into existing bilateral treaty relationships the numerous 
offences ‘covered by’ the Convention (Article 16(3)). Thus where two States Parties 
have relied on outdated and narrow extradition agreements (such as a list-based treaty 
providing for extradition only in relation to a specified list of offences), the TOC 
Convention will substantially expand the range of extraditable offences between them 
(Bullwinkel 2005; Cross 2003). 
 
The Council of Europe Cyber-crime Convention 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE), founded in 1949, comprises 45 countries, including the 
members of the European Union (a separate entity), as well as countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe. Headquartered in Strasbourg, France, the CoE was formed as a 
vehicle for integration in Europe, and its aims include agreements and common 
actions in economic, social, cultural, legal and administrative matters. As one of the 
two principal supranational organisations in Europe (the other being the European 
Union), the CoE is responsible for creating and implementing a wide variety of 
measures aimed at international crime and has adopted a number of widely used 
conventions on interstate cooperation in penal matters. In 1996, the CoE’s European 
Committee on Crime Problems established a committee of experts to address cyber-
crime, which completed its work late in 2001.  
 
The resulting Cyber-crime Convention has three aims: to lay down common 
definitions of certain criminal offences – nine are mentioned in the Convention – thus 
enabling relevant legislation to be harmonised at national level; to define common 
types of investigative powers better suited to the information technology environment, 
thus enabling criminal procedures to be brought into line between countries; and to 
determine both traditional and new types of international cooperation, thus enabling 
cooperating countries to rapidly implement the arrangements for investigation and 
prosecution advocated by the Convention in concert, for example by using a network 
of permanent contacts. The Convention, has received strong support from lawmakers 
and practitioners throughout Europe and beyond. But both the Convention and its 
Additional Protocol have been criticised on various grounds by a number of 
associations, particularly those active in the protection of freedom of expression, and 
also by industry elements (Csonka 2005). 
 
The CoE Convention on Cyber-crime (the ‘Convention’) obligates signatories to 
criminalise a minimum list of specific offences where there was consensus and thus 
harmonised offences to eliminate problems of dual criminality. The basic structure 
and content of the convention is outlined below.  
 
Computer related offences 
Title 1 addresses offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer data such as: (1) illegal access of a computer system; (2) interception of 
non-public transmissions of computer data to, from, or within a computer system; (3) 
interference with computer data; (4) interference with computer systems, such as 
computer sabotage; and (5) the misuse of computer-related devices (e.g. ‘hacker 
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tools’), including the production, sale, procurement for use, import or distribution of 
such devices.  By criminalising illegal access, that is, ‘hacking’, ‘cracking’ or 
‘computer trespass’, sends a clear signal that this conduct is illegal in itself and will 
be prosecuted: such intrusions may give access to confidential data (including 
passwords, information about the targeted system) and secrets or to ‘free’ use of the 
system and might encourage hackers to commit more dangerous forms of computer-
related offences, like computer-related fraud or forgery.  The criminalisation of illegal 
interception protects the privacy rights of data communication and seeks to deter the 
tapping and recording of communications between persons and applies this principle 
to all forms of electronic data transfer, whether by telephone, fax, e-mail or file 
transfer.  The provision on data interference aims at providing computer data and 
computer programs with protection similar to that enjoyed by corporeal objects 
against intentional infliction of damage. Conduct, such as damaging, deteriorating or 
deleting computer data, reduces the integrity or content of data and programs also 
captures malicious codes, and viruses (e.g. Trojan horses). 
 
The Convention criminalises acts of computer sabotage and covers the intentional 
hindering of the lawful use of computer systems, including telecommunications 
facilities, by using or influencing computer data (system interference).  The section 
covering misuse of devices establishes a separate criminal offence including some 
specific conduct (production, distribution, sale, etc.) involving access devices, which 
were primarily designed or adapted for misuse. Devices that are designed and used for 
legal purposes are not included. This offence therefore requires a particular purpose, 
that is, committing any of the other offences against the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of computer systems or data.  Title 2 covers the traditional offences of 
fraud and forgery when carried out through a computer system. For forgery, the intent 
of this provision is to protect computer data in the same manner as tangible 
documents, where such data may be acted upon or used for legal purposes (Esposito 
2004). Note, chapter 5 obliges signatories to criminalise the attempt to commit certain 
offences on which the Convention imposes a criminalisation obligation, as well as 
aiding and abetting the commission of offences and also provides for the liability of 
legal persons. 
 
Content-related offences 
Title 3 seeks to control the use of computer systems as a vehicle for the sexual 
exploitation of children and acts of racists or xenophobic nature. This category of 
offences concerns the subject or contents of computer communications and focuses on 
offences related to children. The Convention makes various acts (from the possession 
to the intentional distribution of child pornography) criminal offences, thus covering 
all links in the chain. This provision criminalises various aspects of the electronic 
production, possession and distribution of child pornography. Most states already 
criminalise the traditional production and physical distribution of child pornography, 
but with increasing use of the Internet as the main method to distribute such material 
specific provisions were essential to combat this new form of sexual exploitation of 
children.  Other types of illegal content, such as racist propaganda, have also been 
included but in the form of an Additional Protocol criminalising racist propaganda. 
Esposito (2004) notes that cyber-crime is now defined as crimes committed against 
and through computer systems. The CoE’s Cyber-crime Convention was originally 
intended to cover only the first category, while there is a growing consensus, at least 
in Europe, of the need to address the second category (e.g. Article 9 of the Cyber-
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crime Convention on cyber-pedopornography, and the Additional Protocol on the 
fight against racism and xenophobia on the Internet).   
 
Offences related to copyright infringement 
Title 4 criminalises wilful infringements of copyright and related rights when such 
infringements have been committed by means of a computer system and on a 
commercial scale. This section targets the large-scale distribution of illegal copies of 
works protected by intellectual property rights (IPR). Infringements of IPR, in 
particular of copyright, are among the most commonly committed offences on the 
Internet, and cause concern both to copyright holders and those who work 
professionally with computer networks.  
 
Jurisdiction 
Among the various important matters addressed by the Convention, was the question 
of jurisdiction in relation to information technology offences, for example to 
determine the place where the offence was committed and which law should 
accordingly apply, including the case of multiple jurisdictions and the question of 
how to solve jurisdictional conflicts. This provision establishes criteria under which 
contracting parties are obliged to establish jurisdiction over the criminal offences in 
the Convention. The provision concerning jurisdiction also requires states exercising 
jurisdiction to coordinate when victims are located in different countries.  
 
Procedural Powers 
The procedural part of the Convention, which also applies to the Additional Protocol 
aims to enable the prosecution of computer crime by establishing common procedural 
rules and adapting traditional measures such as search and seizure and creating new 
measures, such as expedited preservation of data, to remain effective in the volatile 
technological environment. As data in the IT environment is dynamic, other evidence 
collection relevant to telecommunications (such as real-time collection of traffic data 
and interception of content data) has also been adapted to permit the collection of 
electronic data in the process of communication. 
 
Despite fears to the contrary, the Convention addresses specific criminal 
investigations and does not set up an ‘Orwellian’ system of electronic surveillance 
(Esposito 2004). It enables data to be seized, or obliges those who possess the 
relevant data to disclose, or preserve data for investigation, but the Convention does 
not require or justify the surveillance of personal communications or contacts, by 
either service providers or police, unless there is an official criminal investigation.  In 
addition, strong procedural guarantees are included. The Convention will be subject to 
the safeguards provided for by the domestic law of each party, and provides human 
rights protection, as defined by the relevant international instruments (in particular the 
European Commission on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights). It also advocates that before applying the Convention’s powers 
states should ensure that these are proportional to the nature and circumstances of the 
offence under investigation.   
 
The Convention makes it clear that international cooperation is to be provided among 
contracting states ‘to the widest extent possible’. This principle requires them to 
provide extensive cooperation and to minimise impediments to the rapid flow of 
information and evidence. The general scope of the obligation to cooperate stems 
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from the procedural powers defined by the treaty: cooperation is to be provided in 
relation to the offences established, as well as to criminal offences related to computer 
systems and data and to the collection of evidence in electronic form. Thus, if the 
crime is committed by use of a computer system, or where an ordinary crime not 
involving the use of a computer system occurs (e.g. murder) but involves electronic 
evidence, the Convention applies.  
 
The Convention also creates the legal basis for an international computer crime 
assistance network, a network of national contact points permanently available (the 
‘24/7 network’).  The network established by the Convention is based on experience 
gained from the network created by the G8 and co-ordinated by the US Department of 
Justice. Under the Convention, States are obligated to designate a point of contact 
available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in order to ensure immediate assistance 
to investigations within the scope of the Convention. The establishment of this 
network is one of the most important provided by the Convention to ensure States can 
respond effectively to the law enforcement challenges posed by computer crime. This 
network will supplement the more traditional channels of cooperation. Each national 
24/7 contact point is to either facilitate or directly carry out technical or legal advice, 
preservation of data, collection of evidence, and locating of suspects. The Convention 
also requires that national network team be properly trained to respond to computer-
related crime. 
 
The most intrusive powers in the Convention, as Csonka (2005) notes, are the real-
time collection of traffic data and the real-time interception of content data. Both 
powers must be associated with specified communications transmitted by a computer 
system. Both powers enable the real-time collection or real-time interception of data 
by police or by service providers.  With the convergence of telecommunication and 
information technologies, the distinction between telecommunications and computer 
communications is becoming blurred. Thus the definition of ‘computer system’ in the 
Convention does not restrict the manner in which the devices or group of devices may 
be interconnected. These interception powers therefore also apply to communications 
transmitted by means of any computer system, which could include transmission of 
the communication through telecommunication networks before it is received by 
another computer system. The data that can be ordered to be collected is of two types: 
the first concerns traffic data, the second content data. ‘Traffic data’ is defined as any 
computer data relating to a communication made by means of a computer system or 
generated by a computer system and which formed a part of the chain of 
communication, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, path or route, 
time, date, size and duration or the type of service. ‘Content data’ is not defined in the 
Convention but refers to the substance of the communication, that is, the meaning of 
the communication, or the message or information being conveyed (other than traffic 
data). 
 
Global and regional cooperation 
  
Cyber-crime creates an unprecedented need for concerted action from government 
and industry, but also unprecedented challenges to effective international cooperation. 
As noted it is not always clear where computer-related offences take place for the 
purpose of determining criminal jurisdiction. An offence may produce victims in 
many countries, as in cases involving virus attacks, copyright violations, and other 
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offences carried out globally through the Internet. This in turn may result in cross-
border conflicts regarding which jurisdiction(s) should prosecute the offender and 
how such prosecutions can be carried out to avoid inconvenience to witnesses, 
duplication of effort, and unnecessary competition among law enforcement officials 
(Bullwinkel 2005). 
 
The various measures now operating within the European Union, the Council of 
Europe’s Convention, the establishment of EUROPOL and a European Judicial 
Network, provide examples of greater law harmonisation and fewer opportunities for 
transnational criminals to exploit jurisdictional and legal loopholes between nations. 
European initiatives in international crime provide sound examples of the way 
forward in regional cooperation, but may not serve as a model for the development of 
countermeasures in the vastly different socio-cultural and economic circumstances 
found in Africa or Asia (Khoo 2003). Nonetheless, it is clear that cyber-crime, and not 
just the traditional concerns about narcotics and piracy are matters of significant 
concern. Thus ‘international law enforcement’ has shifted from a peripheral to a 
central role within otherwise domestically focused law enforcement agencies. In 
addition, the lines between the policing function and national security appear less 
distinct, and considerable overlap now routinely occurs between the agencies 
countering threats such as cyber-crime, low-intensity warfare and terrorism. Thus 
importance is attached to intra-agency cooperation within jurisdictions and the need to 
improve and maintain these in order to enhance MLA at the regional and international 
level. 
 
Regional efforts outside of Europe are also underway via OAS, ASEAN and the 
APEC forum. Such developments have yet to evolve into fully institutionalised forms 
of cross-border legal cooperation or to determine the response of states within the 
region. There are now significant regional forums for police and other law 
enforcement officials and there is routine exchange of consular police liaison officers 
(Aiziwa 2001). The leading organisations, apart from the United Nations and the 
Council of Europe already described, involved in developing international and 
regional efforts against cyber-crime are briefly described in the sections to follow. 
 
G8 Senior Experts Group on Transnational Organised Crime 
The Group of Eight  (comprising Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, United States and since 1995 - Russia) although originally established to 
co-ordinate economic policy has as well developed initiatives to combat international 
crime. At the Halifax Summit in 1995, G8 heads of state established a cross-
disciplinary group of senior government experts (the ‘Lyon Group’) to address 
methods of combating transnational organised crime.  In 1996 the Lyon Group 
devised 40 recommendations aimed at increasing the efficiency of collective action 
against transnational organised crime via two interrelated goals: strengthened capacity 
in the investigation and prosecution of high-tech crime; and more effective regimes 
for cross-border cooperation in criminal matters.  
 
The Forty Recommendations cover a range of issues and emphasised the need to 
eliminate delay in respect to traditional forms of cross-border assistance (such as 
informal police cooperation, mutual legal assistance, and extradition), and a 
coordinated approach in tackling high-tech crime. As a consequence of these 
recommendations the Lyon Group‘s  ‘High-Tech Crime Subgroup’ was established 
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and quickly thereafter the 24/7 computer security network which has now expanded to 
countries outside the G8. As of the end 2004, 40 countries participate in the global 
24/7 network. Later G8 ministers endorsed a set of principles and an action plan to 
respond to transnational cyber-crime cases that included; provision of adequate 
personnel and training to fight high-tech crime; domestic laws that criminalised 
cyber-crime and ensure that relevant evidence, including traffic data, could be 
preserved and obtained expeditiously; and coordination with industry to ensure that 
new technologies are developed in a way that will facilitate law enforcement action 
against cyber-criminals. The 1999 Moscow meeting later endorsed principles on 
trans-border access to stored computer data and called for a comprehensive response 
to Internet fraud and more industry coordination. A joint communiqué of the G8 
Home Affairs Ministers meeting in Washington on May 10, 2004 noted, given the 
activation of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, that action was 
required “…to encourage the adoption of the legal standards it contains on a broad 
basis” and, “…all countries must continue to improve laws that criminalize misuses of 
computer networks and that allow for faster cooperation on Internet-related 
investigations” (see http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/justice/justice040511_comm.htm 
visited November 14, 2004). 
 
 
ASEAN 
ASEAN comprises 10 nations: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar and, Vietnam. While ASEAN 
has provided a limited pan-Asian approach, it does form a basis for developing a 
wider regional forum for considering matters of MLA. Its approach, even given the 
developing nature of the region, mirrors the methodology of the European Union. The 
sheer cultural and economic diversity of Asia makes the process of multilateralism 
fraught with difficulty (Khoo 2003). Yet understanding the different capacities and 
perspectives of how each state could contribute was an essential first step. The 
endorsement in October 2000 of the action plan of the ASEAN and China 
Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) in partnership 
with the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) illustrates the quickening of 
MLA responses to transnational crime such as cyber-crime. ASEAN has conducted 
four ministerial meetings on problems of transnational crime (Manila 1997, Yangon 
1999, Singapore 2001, Bangkok 2003). These meetings oversee the work of the 
Annual Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime and consider the 
deliberations of meetings of the ASEAN National Chiefs of Police (ASEANAPOL) 
and their cooperative efforts to combat transnational crime.  
 
In 1997, ASEAN interior and home affairs ministers gathered in Manila for the First 
ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime and issued a declaration outlining a 
variety of measures aimed at enhancing regional coordination and cooperation in 
criminal matters. If fully implemented and adequately resourced, the proposals would 
represent a substantial advance in regional law enforcement cooperation.  ASEAN 
ministers agreed to: biannual ministerial meetings to coordinate the activities of 
relevant bodies such as the ASEAN chiefs of national police (ASEANAPOL); hold 
discussions with a view to signing MLA treaties, other bilateral treaties and 
memoranda of understanding among ASEAN member countries; establish an ASEAN 
Centre on Transnational Crime with the task of coordinating regional efforts against 
international crime through intelligence-sharing, harmonisation of policies and 
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operational coordination; convene a high-level ad hoc experts group tasked with 
developing an action plan for tackling transnational crime and an institutional 
framework for regional cooperation; and encourage members to facilitate cooperation 
among law enforcement by posting of foreign liaison officers (see ASEAN 
Declaration on Transnational Crime, signed on December 20, 1997 in Manila: 
available at http://www.aseansec.org/politics/adtc97.htm; visited, November 21, 
2003). At the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (held in 
Myanmar in 1999), ASEAN ministers issued another ambitious communiqué 
outlining a broad plan of action to enhance collective efforts against the many forms 
of organised criminality in the region. A group of senior government officials 
(referred to as the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime or SOMTC) has 
been tasked to assist in the execution of ministerial initiatives and directives.  
 
The theme of greater cooperation carried over to the Third and Fourth ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, at which ASEAN ministers reiterated 
their commitment to collaborate further in the battle against computer-related crime 
and called for a stronger partnership between ASEAN and other partners and 
agencies, including Interpol and the United Nations (see Joint Communique of the 
Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime issued on October 11, 
2001 in Singapore: available at http://www.aseansec.or.id/5621.htm, visited 
November 21, 2003). As noted, the ASEAN anti-crime institutions, particularly 
SOMTC, mimics the G8’s Lyon Group, indicating the relevance of such frameworks 
for collective government action. Particularly significant is that ASEAN’s law 
enforcement experts group reports directly to ministers and thus, like the G8’s Lyon 
Group, has the capacity to develop policies with support at the highest levels.  
 
The European Union and Europol 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community, which in 
turn evolved into the European Union (EU), established under the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992. The EU has 28 member States and recently completed the 
accession of 13 countries in eastern and southern Europe (with some new members 
joining on 1 May 2004). It includes supranational institutions that address 
international crime by adopting joint positions, directives and other instruments 
addressing a wide variety of criminal activities. Among the most important in respect 
to the coordination of law enforcement are: the adoption of a common position on 
negotiations relating to the CoE Cyber-crime Convention and EU conventions on 
mutual assistance in criminal matters and extradition (see 
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/114015b.htm; visited December 11, 
2003), the establishment of a ‘European Judicial Network,’ consisting of liaison 
magistrates and representatives responsible for international judicial cooperation, and 
tasked with facilitating cross-border cooperation (see 
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133055.htm; visited December 11, 
2003). Further strengthening of MLA is contained in the April 19, 2002 ‘Proposal for 
a Council Framework Decision on Attacks Against Information Systems’. 
 
Included within the EU is the European Police Office or Europol, dedicated to 
increasing the efficiency of cooperation among the police agencies of EU member 
states, with an emphasis on targeting organised crime. Based in Brussels, Europol is 
accountable to the EU’s Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. The 
organisation is comprised of European Liaison Officers (who represent national law 
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enforcement agencies across the EU, including police, customs, and immigration 
officials), and Europol staff officers. Like Interpol, Europol’s primary function is to 
support the operational activities of national law enforcement officials and recently 
extended to include the fight against cyber-crime. In furtherance of this its 
representatives facilitate the exchange of information, provide analyses of criminal 
intelligence, generate strategic reports on trends and patterns of criminal activity, and 
provide technical expertise for ongoing investigations within the EU. In addition, it is 
likely Europol will eventually assume a greater investigative and operational role.  
 
 
The Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (OECD) 
Established in Paris in 1960 by 20 countries (now 30 members) the OECD aims to 
promote economic and social welfare throughout the OECD by helping member states 
to coordinate their efforts to aid less developed nations. The OECD has established a 
presence in law enforcement, for example, by establishing a Bribery Working Group, 
whose efforts ultimately led to the adoption of a convention against commercial 
bribery. The OECD has been active in the area of cyber-crime and online security 
especially in regard to encryption technology, evaluating the balance between law 
enforcement and privacy concerns and the means by which member states can 
coordinate encryption policy, and in 1997 issued a series of guidelines addressing 
these issues. More recently, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, 
OECD governments developed a series of guidelines designed to counter cyber-
terrorism, computer viruses, ‘hacking’ and related threats (see OECD Press Release 
dated August 7, 2002; available at http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-
document-29-nodirectorate-no-12-33186-29,00.html). Although the recommendations 
are not legally binding, they reflect consensus among key jurisdictions on issues 
affecting the security of the online environment. 
 
A highly effective approach to inter-governmental law enforcement coordination that 
offers a template for transnational cooperation against cyber-crime is the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) established at the G7 Paris Summit in 1989 and based in 
the OECD. FATF is a policymaking body whose aim is the implementation of 
legislative and regulatory reforms needed to combat money laundering. In 1990, the 
FATF issued a series of 40 recommendations addressing ways to combat and deter 
money laundering. The recommendations are grouped into three broad categories 
(criminal law, banking law and international cooperation) and serve as the basis for its 
activities. As a result of awareness-raising activities undertaken by FATF, a number 
of FATF-style organisations have also developed at the regional level including the 
Asian-Pacific region, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), 
established in 1997, operates in a manner similar to FATF and, in 2000 began to 
undertake a FATF-style mutual evaluation. A novel feature of FATF is that members 
are subject to peer review, a two-part process by which the group assesses 
implementation of the 40 recommendations. First, each FATF member conducts an 
annual self-assessment, using a standard questionnaire. Second, periodically members 
are subject to a process of mutual evaluation, involving a site visit by three or four 
experts from other member governments. Mutual evaluation has proved effective in 
persuading governments to take steps to fill gaps in anti-money laundering (see 
generally http://www.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATF_en.htm). 
 
Interpol 
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The International Criminal Police Organisation, or Interpol, consists of 181 member 
states. Headquartered in Lyon, France, Interpol coordinates its activities through 
National Central Bureaus in individual countries. Its mission, is to support law 
enforcement organisations throughout the world, in particular by facilitating the 
exchange of information, coordinating joint operational activities of member states, 
and developing and sharing expertise and best practices covering a wide range of 
criminal offences (see generally http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/Guide). Nearly 
half of Interpol’s member countries lack the infrastructure for online communication 
(Noble 2003) and thus in respect to IT crime, Interpol has recognised the need for law 
enforcement officials to acquire specialised knowledge and has developed 
international training courses and manuals providing useful guidance for investigators 
working on computer-related crime (see 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/TechnologyCrime/WorkingParties/Default.asp#steerin
gCom).  
 
Interpol’s General Secretariat has also supported the formation of regionally 
organised working groups comprising local experts in computer-related crime who 
meet periodically to share experiences and develop best practices (Noble 2003). The 
Asia-South Pacific Working Party on Information Technology Crime currently meets 
annually, and has undertaken projects relating to the handling of digital evidence, 
forensic tools, and training. Interpol has also endeavoured to build close ties to 
existing regional structures in Asia, including ASEANAPOL, in an effort to build on 
regional cooperation by facilitating the development of regional intelligence databases 
and the wide dissemination of data through Interpol’s extensive telecommunications 
network. Interpol has also stressed financial and high-technology crime as two of 
Interpol’s top five priorities (along with drugs, terrorism, people smuggling and 
organised crime). Interpol has also increased its focus on intellectual property-related 
crime, because sophisticated and well-financed organised criminal groups 
increasingly carry out these offences on a global scale. Interpol hosted an initial 
meeting of its Intellectual Property Crime Action Group in July 2002 (see generally 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/IntellectualProperty/Default/.asp). 
 
Generic problems of forgery and counterfeiting were the focus of Interpol’s 
exemplary efforts in establishing a Universal Classification System for Counterfeit 
Payment Cards secure website. This secure site provides up-to-date information on 
trends and techniques with respect to the forgery of payment cards and fraud and 
enables law enforcement officials around the world to retrieve forensic data as well as 
general intelligence. Payment card industry representatives working in the anti-fraud 
area will also have access to the otherwise closed system. Apart from illustrating how 
Interpol’s unique clearing-house function can be adapted to meet new problems, it 
showed that with support from the payment card industry the law enforcement 
community can better respond. As well as serving as an example of how international 
agencies can assist with essential tasks, such as secure shared intelligence it also 
exemplifies the role of private non-state actors in the prevention of crime.  
 
Newton (2004) described how the Interpol Payment Card Website is also used to 
proactively inform law enforcement and payment card investigators about criminal 
conspiracies and, more importantly, to link apparently unconnected investigations in 
different countries and regions. He cites an example of an apparently isolated attack 
on an ATM in Toronto in 2002 by criminals using a false touch-sensitive PIN pad 
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device to compromise PINs and the electronic data contained on the magnetic stripes 
of genuine payment cards. The device covered the legitimate card slot on the ATM, 
and once customers’ cards had been compromised a screen message advised 
customers to try again later. No transactions actually took place and consequently, in 
the absence of a seized device, it was difficult to identify the point of compromise. On 
this occasion the device was seized although the identity of the suspect(s) was 
unknown. Investigators in Toronto believed that the criminals responsible for the 
attack were situated in Eastern Europe. The case was publicised on the secure 
Payment Card website and as a result a further 11 attacks using identical devices were 
identified in Canada, Chile, Colombia and the United States. The other attacks 
revealed that the criminals were becoming more sophisticated; they were using 
transmitters to transmit compromised data to another location, thereby reducing the 
evidential value of seized devices. More importantly, it was eventually established 
that the perpetrators were actually an organised gang of Venezuelan criminals and not 
from Eastern Europe. 
 
The intelligence was disseminated to investigators worldwide together with a warning 
that this criminal method was likely to migrate to other Spanish-speaking countries in 
the near future. In May 2003 two Venezuelan criminals were arrested in Seville 
carrying out identical attacks on ATMs in the city and another city in Spain. Several 
weeks later seven Venezuelans were arrested using the method in Portugal. Although 
Interpol does not claim direct responsibility for these arrests it is clear that with the 
close cooperation of NCR (a large manufacturer of ATMs), and more significantly 
users of the Payment Card website, it was possible to link these cases together and 
ensure that the law-enforcement and payment card community were fully aware of the 
extent of the criminal methods. Collectively they were able to respond more 
effectively to the threat posed by a determined and sophisticated group of 
international criminals. 
 
Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC)   
Founded in 1989 in Canberra, for the purpose of promoting economic growth among 
member states, APEC now consists of 21 members. APEC is a consensus body that 
meets annually at the ministerial level and historically has focused on trade, but 
increasingly its members look to it as a vehicle for cross-border police cooperation. 
APEC’s work over the past several years has also evolved (as with the G8 and 
OECD) a number of areas relevant to cyber-crime enforcement, including an 
Intellectual Property Rights Working Group (IPEG), and an Electronic Commerce 
Steering Group (ECSG -see generally http://www.apecsec.org.sg/workgroup/e-
commerce.html). The objective of the ECSG, established in 1999, is to coordinate 
APEC-related activities in the area of e-commerce. Thus far, the ECSG has not 
directly addressed law enforcement issues in an e-commerce environment, but 
enforcement also connects to APEC’s general interest in improving consumer trust 
and confidence in e-commerce. Further, the ECSG’s increasingly detailed work in the 
areas of privacy and security in the online environment involve law enforcement 
concerns.  
 
At their meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, in October 2002, APEC leaders noted the 
threat of global terrorism and the importance of increasing the protection of global 
infrastructures and that global communications are only as secure as its weakest link, 
and collectively committed to: enact comprehensive cyber-security laws, on a par 
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with existing international standards, particularly the CoE Cyber-crime Convention 
and UN General Assembly Resolution 55/63 of 2000; identify or create national 
cyber-crime units and international high-technology assistance contact points; and 
establish computer emergency response teams, that exchange threat and vulnerability 
assessments and information. They also called for closer cooperation between law 
enforcement officials and businesses in the field of information security and fighting 
computer crime by endorsing the APEC Cyber-security Strategy. The elements of the 
strategy cover: legal developments; information sharing and cooperation; security and 
technical guidelines; public awareness; training and education; and wireless security. 
APEC’s Telecommunications and Infrastructure Working Group has been most active 
in sponsoring projects to increase the ability of APEC member economies to more 
effectively address cyber-crime, including through greater intergovernmental and 
public–private sector cooperation (see 
http://www.apectelwg.org/apecdata/telwg/28tel/estg/telwg28-ESTG-09.htm).  
 
Urbas (2005) observed in concluding an overview of legislation in Asia that the 
development of legislation designed to counter intellectual property offences and 
cyber-crime showed that while some states had enacted new laws, many remained ill-
equipped to deal with the cross-border nature of these offences. Orlowski (2004) also 
reported an APEC cyber-crime legislation survey involving 14 nations that found all 
had some legislative provisions to address cyber-crime and to support law 
enforcement (see http://www.apectel28.com.tw/document/webword/estg/telwg28-
ESTG-07.doc). However, mutual legal assistance, extradition arrangements, and 
provision of cross-border information in respect of computer offences were found in 
only half the countries surveyed. The survey noted that the main concerns related to 
the difficulties in requesting the collection and preservation of evidence in real time, 
issues relating to jurisdiction for offences and offenders, and lack of, or limitations in, 
mutual assistance and extradition arrangements. APEC has called for further work to 
develop laws and procedures that facilitate the investigation and prosecution of cross-
jurisdictional cyber-crime. As noted above, it is essential to continually monitor 
progress and where necessary provide assistance and encouragement to ensure that 
MLA is not impeded. 
 
Summary of measures for regional co-operation  
Given the diversity of the above activities aimed at improving regional and 
international cooperation the basic ingredients for a global approach can be deduced. 
Grabosky and Broadhurst (2005) outline the basic elements of an effective regime for 
regional cooperation in combating cyber-crime that include the following:  
 
• improve security awareness by providing adequate resources to secure 
transactions and equip system operators and administrators;  
• improve coordination and collaboration by enabling systematic exchanges 
between the private sector and law enforcement including joint operations; 
• take steps to ensure that technology does not outpace the ability of law 
enforcement to investigate and enact substantive and procedural laws adequate 
to cope with current and anticipated manifestations of cyber-crime; 
• broadly criminalise the conduct (including juvenile offenders) and focus on all 
violators big and small; 
• strengthen international initiatives by updating existing treaties and 
agreements to recognise the existence, threats and transnational nature of high-
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tech computer-related crimes and strive for legal harmonization; and  
• the development of forensic computing skills by law enforcement and 
investigative personnel and  mechanisms for operational cooperation between 
law enforcement agencies from different countries, i.e. 24/7 points of contact 
for investigators. 
 
Work-in-progress: comity between states and cyber-crime 
 
In future, organised crime may be expected to recruit IT specialists, intimidate 
corporate insiders to obtain access to IT systems, and use anonymisers and encryption 
in furtherance of cyber-crime. In addition, there is evidence of the deployment of 
intelligent malicious software designed to elude detection by anti-virus software. Now 
automated ‘intelligent’ computer and network attack capabilities allow remote 
initiation of attacks to be directed at any computer or network on the Internet while 
making it more difficult to identify the actual source of the attack. These advanced 
forms of intrusion code enable users to gain competitive advantage by extracting 
sensitive economic data from competitors, provide data (such as customer’s records) 
for extortion and denial of service offences. Most significantly, attacks are 
instantaneous and often remote, disregarding national sovereignty. Whether they are 
the work of a 14-year-old, a terrorist, a foreign intelligence service or an organised 
criminal may not be immediately apparent; all must be investigated. However, digital 
technology also affords new opportunities for individual citizens to communicate 
efficiently with police. An example is the Internet Fraud Complaint Center, which 
operates in the United States and receives on-line information from members of the 
public relating to questionable on-line activity and these are evaluated and referred to 
the appropriate agency or jurisdiction.  
 
Digital footprints are fragile or ephemeral, so swift action is often required. This 
becomes very difficult when an attack transits multiple jurisdictions with different 
regimes for preserving evidence. Traditional methods of law enforcement are 
therefore no longer adequate. A slow formal process risks losing evidence, and 
multiple countries may be implicated. Following and preserving a chain of evidence is 
a great challenge. Among the challenges faced by investigators is the enormous 
increase in storage capacity in today’s computers, and the challenge to effective and 
efficient searches that this entails. Almost every case will soon require computer 
forensics, and evidence will be located in multiple places. The challenge faced by 
investigators will be one of information management (Pollitt 2003). Even ‘local’ 
crimes may have an international dimension, and assistance may be required from all 
countries through which an attack was routed. An example is the case of ‘Mafiaboy’, 
whose distributed denial of service attacks in February 2000 was a watershed event: 
the seriousness of the threat and the vulnerability of e-commerce became apparent. 
The investigation of ‘Mafiaboy’ was a textbook example of close cooperation 
between the FBI and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; only rapid and close 
collaboration between the two police services could have achieved such a result. 
 
Many nations and regional bodies such as the Council of Europe have addressed the 
problem of cyber-crime and laws exist that criminalise unauthorised access and 
unlawful use of computers, but such laws are neither universal nor uniform. Concerns 
remain focused on the ‘weakest links’ in the supposedly seamless security chain 
necessary to prevent cyber-crime by predatory criminal groups. Comity thus can only 
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be assured if wealthy states and affected industries are prepared to extend aid to those 
states or agencies less capable. Consensus is the best strategy, for the suppression of 
computer-related crime entails a mixture of law enforcement, technological and 
market-based solutions. It can be argued, however, that a strict enforcement agenda is 
usually not feasible because of the limited capacity of the state. It is also feared that 
over-regulation could stifle commercial and technological development. Those 
sceptical of a heavily interventionist approach also argue that the marketplace may at 
times be able to provide more efficient solutions to the problems of computer-related 
crime than the state. Even if they were increased, police resources could never be 
enough. Deficits characterise the technical and computing capacities of public police, 
and it is often difficult to retain trained agents.  
 
Although there is consensus about the risks of computer-related crime, apart from 
criminalising the conduct at a global level, there is much less consensus about what 
might be done to prevent it. There is concern that the technological solution to 
information security is a mirage, more hope than reality, and that dependence on the 
promise of a technology fix is an approach fated to fail. So also is the faith in a 
deterrence-based approach where the criminal law is deployed as the principal 
instrument of prevention. Deterrence is unlikely to succeed in all or even some 
circumstances, and experience with conventional crime suggests that over-reliance on 
the law, as a deterrent or moral educator alone is unlikely to help substantially even if 
legitimately supported by the community.  
 
Fundamentally systems can be designed to lessen their vulnerability to criminal 
exploitation. Cyber-crime is often facilitated by vulnerable software, much of which 
is designed with user-friendliness and convenience in mind rather than security. The 
common industry response is for manufacturers to structure their licence conditions to 
avoid potential liability, then to make ‘patches’ available as vulnerabilities become 
apparent later on. Whether market forces will eventually drive the widespread 
development of truly secure software remains to be seen. Commercial enterprises may 
be in a position to achieve more protection than poorly resourced law enforcement 
agencies could deliver. In this respect I am reminded of earlier examples from the 
heyday of the mass production of the motor vehicle when consumer safety was 
knowingly compromised in the pursuit of profit. Manufacturers who quickly 
recognised the market value of safe products and retooled accordingly retained 
profitability, while those that did not faltered. Microsoft Corporation has now, it 
seems, reflected on its failure to lead the market in respect to consumer safety and to 
recognise that today the market demands a secure and trusted environment if 
computers and information technology are to realise their full potential.  
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